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Introduction 
Anti-satellite weapons are amongst the most disconcerting military technologies currently 
being developed. One of the most notable advances into anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities in the 
recent years is being developed by China, which has conducted numerous ASAT weapons test in 
the last few years, most notably in 2007. This sparked a new wave of concerns over the 
implications of ASAT weapons on the state and its population.  
This paper seeks to analyze the military implications and the legal restrictions of ASAT 
weapons. In order to do so, this study will analyze the weapons, as well as the connotations of 
Chinese testing in regards to the utility and incentives of ASAT research. After this introduction 
and literature review, a thorough analysis of the effect of ASAT missiles on four different types 
of strategically and tactically significant satellite – in regards to navigation, communication, 
reconnaissance, and ballistic missile early warning systems – will be presented, whereas the main 
focus of this part attempts to relate its findings to Chinese capabilities and intentions. Lastly, this 
paper will review international laws and the legal framework pertaining to the use of ASAT 
missiles. Through this analysis, this work seeks to outline the severe security implications of 
ASAT missiles to the state – as an international actor –, as well as the international community. 
Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the question “What are the military and legal implications 
of Anti-satellite Missiles?” 
Literature Review 
The type of literary sources this thesis uses is manifold: this paper mostly reviews various 
articles from technical and theoretical academic journals in order to explain functions and 
implications of satellites and ASAT weaponry. Additionally to these peer-reviewed articles, this 
thesis also makes use of some university publications to gain further insight into the studies that 
have been conducted previously. Apart from these academic sources, government and military 
documents and reports are used to support the arguments of this study, especially concerning the 
reactions towards the Chinese ASAT tests. UN documents are also cited, whereas this is mostly 
in the context of the legal implications of ASAT weapons. The last significant type of source 
used in this study is policy-papers and think tank publications. All these types of documents are 
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based on individual agendas, which should be taken into account; for example, the UN is 
notoriously ambiguous when determining legality in order to leave room for interpretation 
(Wood, 1998, pp. 73-74). US policy-papers, on the other hand, have the specific purpose of 
addressing primary concerns for the US in terms of national security and military strategy. 
Therefore, these respective sources will be applied in the context of their assertions. 
The main sources used in this paper are an array of articles written in English and 
gathered from European and American sources. Whilst this paper focuses on the Chinese ASAT 
programme, it is relatively difficult to analyse any information about this topic from non-Western 
literature for two reasons: Firstly, other reliable sources on this topic are mostly in Chinese and 
are therefore inaccessible to those who do not understand the language to an academic degree; 
secondly, like most other great powers, China is very reluctant to share information about its 
ASAT weapon tests. Since this information is largely inaccessible, it is difficult to find academic 
sources on the actual intentions and programmes of China. This paper therefore presents a form 
of Western interpretation of the potential aim of the Chinese strives for better ASAT capabilities.  
The absence of ASAT missiles in academia is noticeable when researching the security 
implications regarding satellites. Whilst there is much information about the technical details in 
general, there is little information in terms of feasible reports and analysis. This specifically 
concerns the Chinese ASAT missile programme. Whilst there is seemingly more analysis of the 
Chinese programme than of the US programme, the selection of papers dedicated entirely to 
ASAT missiles is still somewhat lacking. As previously mentioned, China is also very discrete 
about its ASAT missile programme, meaning that there are few figures and empirical evidence on 
how far the programme has developed since the test in 2007. For these reasons, this paper 
attempts to not only contribute to a research gap, but also to draw attention to this issue and call 
for further investigation.  
In regards to IR theory, this paper applies Neo-Realism as primary paradigm to analyze 
the military and legal implications of ASAT technologies. Neo-Realism can provide essential 
insight into motivations and incentives; particularly in the military strategy part of this paper. 
Realism is amongst the most respected paradigm in international relations theory and has a 
relevant contribution to policy-making and the study of international relations per se (Donelly, 
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2013, pp. 32). Furthermore, this paradigm, as outlined in the study, is significant in regards to 
ASAT weapons in a military and legal sense. 
Part I: Technical Aspects of ASAT Weapons 
In the context of this paper, one must first understand what satellites are, how they 
operate, and what functions they fulfil. A satellite is a mechanical object continuously circling 
around space. These satellites are all fixed in the Earth’s orbit and thereby practically hover 
above the earth. These satellites have many functions such as strategic, political, economic, 
social, and scientific purposes (Wood, 2003, p. 13). Various types of satellites exist, including 
weather satellites, communication satellites, observation satellites, surveillance satellites, and 
others. In principal, a satellite allows its owner to see the world from above and thus gather 
special and temporal information on topography and geology, as well as military movement, for 
example (van Niekirk & Combrinck, 2012, pp. 1-2). Therefore, satellites are a vital tool for 
governments, companies, and sometimes even for private individuals of the general public. The 
probability or concern of losing such a satellite is relatively low; however, in recent years, the 
fear of ASAT weapons has increased. 
Technical Details of the Weapon 
Although there are at least three different types of ASAT weapon, this paper focuses on 
ASAT missiles. ASAT missiles are, in essence, very similar to ballistic missiles. They use much 
of the same technology in terms of conventional propulsion and technology. China, for example, 
seemingly uses a modified ballistic missile launch vehicle for its ASAT tests (Easton, 2009, p.2). 
Unlike the launch vehicle, however, the guidance and delivery systems are mostly based on Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems (ABMs). Thus, the Chinese ASAT programme uses ground-based 
radars as guiding systems in order to target satellites (Easton, 2009 p. 2). Furthermore, Ian Easton 
argues that unverified sources suggest that the missile itself is based on a Russian ground-to-air 
ABM system (Easton, 2009 p. 3). This means that China may have modified Russian defence 
missiles to create one of the most advanced ASAT weapon programmes in the world. In fact, the 
Chinese ASAT missile systems are most likely far more advanced than Russian ASAT systems, 
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as Russia discontinued the former Soviet experimentation with ASAT missiles in 1993 (Podvig, 
2008, p. 22).  
Ballistic missiles and ASAT missiles also fulfil a similar function, with the difference that 
a ballistic missile leaves the atmosphere in order to reach its destination quickly, whilst the final 
destination of ASAT missiles is an object in orbit. In the Chinese weapon test in 2007, the missile 
was directly targeted at an outdated weather satellite in low earth orbit (Liemer & Chyba, 2010, 
p. 149). The ASAT missile collided with the satellite, thus destroying it and creating various 
debris fragments (Liemer & Chyba, 2010, p. 149). Whilst collision is seemingly the most reliable 
means to destroy a satellite at the current stage of development, inquiries and experimentation 
regarding electro-magnetic pulses (EMPs) have also been conducted. An EMP is a pulse, which 
destroys all electronic circuits and components within a certain area; this makes it valuable for 
conventional and unconventional warfare (Gibson & Kemmerly, 2009, p. 238). Furthermore, 
such capabilities would vastly change the implications of ASAT missiles: ASAT missiles armed 
with an EMP might destroy entire clusters of satellite as long as these are in range. Whilst this 
paper concerns itself mostly with contemporary technologies of this weapon, one should keep in 
mind that any strategic and tactical implications discussed in this thesis would be reinforced and 
amplified by the successful development of reliable EMP warheads. 
Amongst the most important aspects concerning the technical dynamics of ASAT missiles 
is that there is currently no reliable means of destroying a large barrage of such missiles before 
they reach their target. As outlined previously, ASAT missiles generally operate as ballistic 
missiles do; however, since they do not re-enter the atmosphere, a reaction to such an attack 
would have to be extraordinarily swift and accurate. A complex network of satellites and 
interceptor missiles is necessary in order to secure a satellite from such an assault. Interceptor 
missiles are the primary defence against a ballistic missile threat, as they destroy such a missile 
before it succeeds in destroying its target (Weeden, 2014, p. 28). These interceptors, however, 
possess an inherent ASAT capacity and have recently been used by the US to destroy a 
dysfunctional satellite (Grego, 2011, p. 1) In theory these interceptors could also be used as 
ASAT defence; however, this dimension of interceptors has not been tested so far. This renders 
satellites quite vulnerable to ASAT missiles, should a state such as China employ these weapons 
against opposing states or even sub-national actors, who are in possession of satellites. Whilst 
this paper acknowledges that the disruption in a state’s satellite network can have vast 
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implications on social and commercial levels; this work will dedicate the next section to the 
analysis of tactical and strategic military implications for national and international security.   
General History of ASAT Weapons 
In addition to the technical aspects, a historical context is significant in estimating the 
ASAT threat to military and security strategies around the world. ASAT missiles were originally 
created in the context of the Cold War, whereas both the USA and the USSR created an ASAT 
weapon programme in the 1950s and 1960s (Liemer & Chyba, 2010, p. 152). Whilst the 
programme continued to be funded, it was of secondary priority: satellites and computer 
networks were not very refined then, and the nuclear arms race took precedent for both parties; 
therefore, the individual projects were not discontinued, but were mostly insignificant in regards 
to policy-making of the Cold War. Emphasis was placed on destructive capabilities in terms of 
nuclear weapons: a trend which can be observed in the 1970s when nuclear stockpiles reached a 
pinnacle (Woolf, 2016, p. 9). Furthermore, after the fall of the Soviet Union, US policy was not 
concerned with the securitization of satellites; after all, no political entity had the militaristic, 
economic, and political power to threaten US satellites. In recent years, however, the investment 
into ASAT missiles began to increase once more in various parts of the world. 
The years since the fall of the Soviet Union sparked a new technological foray into ASAT 
weapons. Satellites became increasingly important in all matters of state affairs, such as 
communication and information gathering, and began developing a social element as mobile 
phones and computer networks became more popular. For this reason, satellites became a vital 
tool for a modern functioning society which, in turn, resulted in various smaller regional powers 
in investing in their respective ASAT weapon programmes. Whilst previously ASAT weapons 
could only be developed by the two great powers of the Cold War, recent Chinese displays of 
functional ASAT missiles have also unsettled the international community (Liemer & Chyba, 
2010, p. 153) Additionally, according to recent news articles and public statements, Israel and 
India are also striving to develop their ASAT missiles to consolidate their security status within 
their regions (Opall-Rome, 2009) (Vasani, 2016) (Liemer & Chyba, 2010, p. 150). China, 
however, is particularly interesting as it is the first global power that has successfully constructed 
and tested ASAT missiles after the two superpowers which dominated Cold War relations. 
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Through the proven functionality of the Chinese ASAT programme and the increased 
significance of satellites the topic became more relevant in security policies. 
 History of the Chinese ASAT Programme 
The Chinese ASAT missile programme is rather young. Unlike its peers, China only 
began research into ASAT weapons in 1964, whereas this programme was split into three parts: 
isotropic nuclear weapons (non-directional weapons targeting large areas), kinetic-energy 
weapons (which are projectiles), and directed-energy weapons (radio-frequency, laser, or particle 
beam weapons) (Gouveia, 2005, p. 166). These have various different implications; for example, 
the previously mentioned EMP weapon would be an example of an isotropic nuclear weapon. 
This paper focuses on direct fire projectiles in particular; however, in order to grasp the 
significance of Chinese ASAT capabilities, the other two weapons should be remembered, as 
they are potentially valuable in the analysis of military strategy.  
Since the initial implementation of this programme China had not tested its weapons 
openly until 2007. In 2007, China tested an ASAT missile of the SC-19 system by targeting an 
outdated Chinese weather satellite (Weeden, 2014, p. 9). The test was a success, provoking an 
array of reactions. Various states proclaimed this programme a threat to international and national 
security, while some sub-national actors demanded an international test ban for ASAT weapons 
(Grego, 2007) (Liemer & Chyba, 2010). Apart from weariness towards Chinese developments, 
however, little changed in the international community. Instead of attempting to prohibit Chinese 
advances, more emphasis was placed on national security and a comprehensive security 
framework through which the US, for example, may defend against a potential attack on its 
satellites.  
A significant problem about the Chinese ASAT test is also its furtive nature. Since the 
2007 test and the international reaction to this test, China has not publicly admitted to conducting 
more tests. Even so, evidence suggests that China has engaged in similar tests in 2010 and 2013, 
although these allegations have thus far remained unverified (Weeden, 2013, p. 2). Additionally, 
in 2013, China announced the launch of a suborbital rocket in the upper ionosphere carrying a 
scientific payload (Murray, 2013, pp. 1-4). Disclosure concerning the content of this payload, 
however, was not provided which led to the assumption that China is developing its programme 
to reach satellites in higher orbit - indeed, an open study including satellite imagery has 
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concluded that these fears may not be unfounded (Murray, 2013, pp. 1-4) (Weeden, 2014, p. 4-
19). As this paper unfolds, the various military and legal implications should clarify why the 
Chinese ASAT programme in particular can be considered dangerous to international security: 
the conduct of these tests is a first implication that China has the wealth and power to support and 
further fund its ASAT programme, whilst the lack of transparency discomforts power space-
faring nations such as the US and Russia. 
Having covered the technological and historical aspects of ASAT weapons and satellites, 
the next section will engage the primary military concerns. The following section will at times 
reference some technical aspects of ballistic missiles as outlined above. 
Part II: Military Implications 
The second and main part of this thesis concerns the strategic military implications of 
ASAT weapons with a more specific analysis of the Chinese programme and its implications for 
Russian and US policy. This part is divided into four sub-section, each addressing another type of 
satellite which may be targeted by an ASAT missile: 1) GPS (and navigation) satellites, 2) 
Communication satellites, 3) Information gathering satellites, 4) Early warning systems meant to 
detect a ballistic assault. This section will inspect the functions and technologies behind these 
various satellites and how they are connected to the military apparatus. Furthermore, the thesis 
will assess the likelihood of ASAT missiles used against such satellites and the strategic and 
tactical significance of such an attack. Through this analysis, this paper seeks to provide a 
comprehensive outline of the potential threat ASAT weapons pose. 
Global Positioning System (GPS)  
The first element of modern military strategy affected by ASAT weapons this paper 
reviews concerns the Global Positioning System (GPS). GPS is the American global navigation 
satellite system. In order to analyze this paper adequately, it will not analyze the military 
implication of ASAT weapons on navigation systems in general, as GPS is arguably the most 
notable of them all. GPS is amongst the most commonly used navigation systems by the US and 
its allies, such as South Africa, particularly in regards to military actions (van Niekirk & 
Combrinck, 2012, p. 1). Therefore, whilst this paper acknowledges that the European Union, 
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Russia, and other states may employ alternate navigation systems, this paper reviews GPS as 
particular case study, due to its significance to the US and its allies. Many claims also relate to 
any other navigation system. 
Before delving into the implications of a disruption in this network, one must consider 
what GPS is and how it functions. GPS is an information network of satellites, which gathers 
geographical data from high orbit (Gouveia, 2005, p. 167). This data is generally used to track the 
specific location in time and space of individuals or groups, and is able to provide further 
information, such as velocity and time calculations (Lachow, 1995, p. 126). According to 
contemporary data from the US Naval Observatory, the network currently consists of 32 high-
altitude orbiting satellites (USNO, 2016). This system could track an address or even a signal 
with an accuracy of 20-100 meters in 1995 (Lachow, 1995, p. 140) – whereas this technology has 
tremendously improved since then – making the system highly versatile and useful for US 
military interests. 
The US military has made extensive use of GPS to conduct its affairs. As previously 
mentioned, the tracking system is highly accurate and precise, allowing a commander in 
Washington to oversee an operation around the globe. Militaristically, a common use of such a 
satellite is determining the position of an individual or a unit geographically, and thus aiding their 
superiors to make tactical decisions in regards to their location. When a specific asset is of 
particular use for the US military, they may focus the attention of the satellites to this particular 
geographic location. As GPS observes the Earth in real time, it allows for a quick and fluent 
chain of command. Generally speaking, in the modern US army, commands are given from far 
away, but with more information than a commander on the ground may have. Currently, such 
navigation systems are increasingly significant in determining military operations as cartographic 
military demands rise (Nagy, 2004, pp. 589-597). If a state that is relatively reliant on GPS 
satellites for troop mobilization loses this connection network, it may have significant 
implications on tactical troop mobilization. Should an ASAT missile be able to destroy several 
GPS satellites orbiting over a certain part of the world, China could effectively cripple US 
military operations – if only for a very short period of time. Without GPS, alternative means of 
communication would have to be established. Furthermore, vital military supplies would be more 
difficult to distribute, as it also becomes challenging to track troop movements.  
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According to and article by Irwin Lachow, there are three primary uses for GPS in the 
military: Land use, aircraft use, and joint-military operation use (Lachow, 1995, p. 127) – 
although naval use is also highly important. The three main benefits of GPS in land use are self-
location, navigation, and target location. Self-location and target location in particular are 
important in modern warfare as to avoid the bombardment of allied troops. Bombing accuracy is 
also important for airborne use, as GPS is used to navigate missiles, bombs, and airplanes 
themselves (Lachow, 1995, p. 134). Navigation is a large part of GPS systems, as without this 
tool, particularly ships and airborne vehicles would need to utilize a less reliable navigation 
system. Lastly, in joint-military exercises, GPS increases the effectiveness of the modus operandi 
between two branches of military or alternatively different national militaries. It should be 
mentioned, however, that GPS satellites have the potential to navigate ballistic missiles 
accurately. 
The destruction of one or more GPS or communication satellites might not actually be 
quite devastating or probable. It is currently unclear whether the US has prepared for a system 
failure, and how it would react in response. Thus, whilst it would certainly hinder military 
operations momentarily, the US is potentially prepared for such an act of aggression and would 
react swiftly. Furthermore, one must remember that although GPS is used worldwide, it is a US 
system and only the US and its allies rely on this system for military deployment (van Niekirk & 
Combrinck, 2012, p. 1). An ASAT missile might therefore devastate the US – and potentially its 
allies –, but would have little impact on militaries from other states such as Russia. Even so, the 
US is the most technologically advanced and militarized state on the globe, and is threatened by 
this newest Chinese programme, which also poses a direct threat to other navigation systems. 
Whilst the probability of such an occurrence is relatively low, it may have detrimental effects. 
Communication 
The second type of satellite under consideration in the strategic implications of ASAT 
warfare is the communication satellite. Communication satellites are significant for civil and 
military means; for the sake of this analysis, however, this paper focuses mostly on the military 
dimension. In military terms, communication satellites are used in a similar manner to GPS 
satellites with the primary function of simplifying and optimizing the structure of the military. 
They allow for quick communication throughout the chain of command rendering this satellite a 
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vital asset, particularly in regards to military operations conducted on a global scale such as the 
War on Terror. The military commanders may therefore adequately employ their forces as long 
as the communication system is not interrupted (Wilgenbusch & Heisig, 2013, p. 57).  
The question of whether communication satellites are viable targets is difficult to answer. 
This type of satellite is generally not particularly vulnerable to the current technologies of ASAT 
missiles. The Chinese demonstrated the ability to target satellites; however, the weather satellite 
targeted in one of its previous tests was flying in relatively low orbit (Wood, 2003, pp. 15-16). 
China is continuously improving its ASAT weapon system: with more technological advances in 
propulsion of an ASAT weapon, high orbit targets such as communication satellites become 
vulnerable to such an act of aggression. Additionally, satellites may be involved in public use, 
particularly in regards to telecommunication satellites. Targeting the right satellite could grant a 
tactical advantage, whereas alternatively, the targeted satellite might be insignificant to military 
activities. It is principally impossible to distinguish a military satellite from a commercial 
satellite, which means that it becomes very difficult to completely deny an adversary the means 
to correspond through communication satellites. 
Even so, the successful application of an ASAT weapon against a communication satellite 
would have tremendous tactical implications. Through the disruption of communications with the 
commanders at home, for example, the ground forces are left to their own devices. No 
information of GPS or information-gathering satellites would reach these forces, meaning they 
would have to rely on visual information. In a brief engagement this could mean the swift defeat 
of an enemy through flank manoeuvres or unforeseen bombardment, as no information of such 
attacks could be relayed. As mentioned, however, missing links in the communication network 
would probably be replaced expeditiously. This means that there is very little long-term strategic 
significance to the destruction of communication satellites, unless it becomes a common doctrine. 
If this is the case, it seems logical that affected parties, such as Russia or the US would invest 
more money in the production of interceptor missiles and other means to secure their satellites. In 
essence, the use of an ASAT missile against a communication satellite would most likely only 
occur to shock the enemy once in a brief but effective engagement.  
In terms of naval and airborne warfare, communication satellites are even more 
significant. The various navies of the great powers in the world rely largely on communication 
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satellites in order to locate themselves, the enemies, and adjust their aim accordingly, much like 
artillery does (Lachow, 1995, pp. 133-137). Furthermore, communication satellites are important 
for airborne warfare, as pilots rely heavily on orders and information concerning the previously 
mentioned aspects such as aiming, but also landing the aircraft and making sure to not collide 
with another airplane by accident. Various satellites including GPS and communication satellites 
determine these factors, whereas a ASAT assault on a large scale may severely affect military 
operation in states such as the US or Russia. The result of such an attack would be momentary 
chaos, rendering it relatively easy to overwhelm the adversary with careful timing. 
Information-gathering 
The third strategic implication of ASAT weapons concerns information-gathering 
satellites. For the purposes of this essay, the sub-section on information-gather satellites is 
divided into two categories: spy satellites, and reconnaissance satellites. The fundamental 
difference between these two satellites is that spy satellites are employed on short-term missions. 
Their purpose is to quickly expose movements or locations momentarily and relay this 
information back. Reconnaissance satellites are the spy satellites’ counterpart: they are utilized in 
long-term missions, generally observing a specific speck of land in which large amounts of 
activity of potential adversaries to the satellite’s home state can be found. Therefore, it is 
relatively easy to separate the tactical application to the strategic ones: Spy satellites are used in 
tactical engagements for quick information; reconnaissance satellites are strategic assets 
overseeing vast pieces of area over a long time. These satellites were introduced in the 1960s and 
were originally exclusive to the US and shortly thereafter Russia (Hastedt, 2007, p. 381), whereas 
the technology later proliferated to other states and international entities, most notably members 
of the European Union, India, Pakistan and Israel (Hastedt, 2007, p. 381). In the contemporary 
world, spy satellites are significant tools to observe potentially hostile nations and are the most 
utilized set of military asset in Earth’s orbit. 
Numerous governments throughout the globe utilize spy satellites to survey domestic and 
foreign forces. This means of surveillance is vital in modern politics and governments and 
militaries are known to create policies in reaction to images captured by spy satellites (Hastedt, 
2007, p. 369). Initially, this type of satellite was created in the US in order to perceive Russian 
logistical movements. Thus, it was meant to serve as means to uncover locations of missile silos, 
THE SATELLITE’S DOWNFALL  Daniel J. Voigt 
 14 
strong defence positioning, troop mobilization, and even gather information about military 
logistics. Since the beginning of warfare, such information is vital in devising strategies and 
tactics to overpower the adversary. As Chinese general and military strategist Sun Tze famously 
wrote: “If you know your enemies and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred 
battles.” (Sun Tze, 1910, p. 52). This quote suggests that if you are aware of enemy motivations 
and movements, you are able to overcome your enemies with tactical brilliance. No means have 
perfected this diffusion of information more than satellites in the late 20th century. 
The importance of such reconnaissance and spy satellites reflects in the conduct of 
international relations in the 20th century. One of many examples of the influence of such 
surveillance means is given in the prelude to the Iraq War in 2003. Whilst numerous elements 
contributed to the act of war, one of the most crucial factors of the international turmoil 
concerned pictures taken from satellites (Bassil, 2012, p. 32). These pictures were used as 
reasoning to conduct the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as the US presented these pictures to the UN as 
evidence of illegal activity and indication of the construction of a weapon of mass destruction 
(Bassil, 2012 p. 32). This was vital in the reasoning of the US to intervene, and although the 
original claims were dismantled later, these pictures were used as political and military tool 
whilst also granting certain information that is important for security reasons. This use of a 
satellite as political tool exemplifies the significance of surveillance satellites to various countries 
and their shaping of politics; in order to answer the question of this paper, one must consider the 
new possibility of ASAT missiles targeting one such technical device.  
In comparison to the other two types of satellites that might be targeted, the destruction of 
surveillance satellites is most likely the least threatening application of an ASAT missile. Whilst 
communication and early warning systems would have direct short-term impacts on the military, 
ASAT weapons would merely deprive a state from observing another. Such a missile would, 
therefore, strongly weaken the information-gathering network of great powers such as the US and 
Russia. If China would use its ASAT capabilities to prevent any satellite from gathering 
information, it would be able to perform unseen shifts in its military landscape. Logistical centres 
could be relocated, silos could be disarmed or armed, troops could be mobilized to attack, 
pressure, or defend a specific location amongst other acts. In reference to the earlier quote from 
Sun Tze, such knowledge of such information is a key element in military strategy. This type of 
knowledge may also possess immediate tactical advantages. 
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Considering the surveillance satellites discussed, it seems that a temporary disruption of 
the flow of information to another state may provide the aggressor with opportunities. The 
disruptions of the information network would be a great inconvenience from a militaristic 
viewpoint and present the aggressor with an extreme tactical advantage. Although there would be 
political and legal repercussions of destroying another state’s spy satellite, the consequences 
would be nowhere near as tremendous as in the destruction of a launch satellite or an early 
warning programme. The destruction of a spy satellite would most likely, however, become an 
international incident, rather than leading to a violent conflict between the parties. Considering 
the technical aspects of an ASAT missile – which currently cannot reach launch system satellites 
– this seems to be the most feasible application of this weapon. The risks of using an ASAT in 
this case are relatively low, whereas potential gains are vast. 
Early Warning Systems 
The final, and arguably most important satellite in military operation concerns early 
warning systems. Early warning systems are observation satellites which monitor Earth’s orbit, 
and particularly ballistic missile launch sites on the planet. In doing so, early warning systems are 
able to gather information on any launches of ballistic missiles, thus directly contacting the Anti-
ballistic missile systems. It is important to note that the primary function of such a satellite 
network is to determine the launch of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from a point 
in geo-stationary orbit (Canan, 2011, pp. 26-27) – this means these satellites remain in the same 
position relative to the Earth movement, but far above. This subsection will analyse the facets of 
the possession or use of ballistic missiles and ABMs. Furthermore, this part relies heavily on the 
theoretical aspects of nuclear deterrence and space dominance in order to interpret the Chinese 
attempt to develop its ASAT capabilities. 
In order to assess the implicit significance of early warning systems one must first assess 
ballistic missiles themselves and the threat they pose to the state and the international community. 
Ballistic missiles enter orbit in order to travel with immense speed and little vulnerability to 
detection along a suborbital trajectory before re-entering the atmosphere and striking its target 
location (Caston et al, 2014, p. 73). Some scholars have made the comparison to artillery, but 
operating within a larger dimension (Gibson & Kemmerly, 2009, p. 235). These missiles are 
often designed to act as a vehicle for a warhead armed with a weapon of mass destruction, often 
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of nuclear nature (Caston et al, 2014, pp. 74-75). The significance of nuclear weapons in 
contemporary world politics is undeniable: since the dropping of the first atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have become an important tool in the conduct of 
foreign policy ranging from the early use of the weapon, through the policies of containment and 
nuclear deterrence in the Cold War, to contemporary issues such as the nuclear deal with Iran and 
the North Korean development of ICBMs. Thus, the ability to track such a missile with an early 
warning satellite system and potentially avert disaster through the use of a sophisticated ABM 
system may greatly improve state security. 
In addition to ballistic missiles, it is also important to understand the counter-measure 
which is so closely linked to the early warning systems: Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems. 
ABM systems are highly sophisticated defensive complexes which aim to destroy incoming 
missiles before they reach their target destination. These defence systems employ interceptor 
missiles which are meant to detonate nuclear missiles far above ground; furthermore, in order to 
function properly, this system is highly reliant on the early warning systems. Early warning 
systems track the movement of an incoming rocket, thus granting the ABM the ability to lock 
onto that signal (Koltunov, Kubyshkin, & Stephanov, 2015, p. 83). In the case of the destruction 
of an early warning system, the ABM system would almost be useless, as it cannot be targeted 
with precision. 
The impact of the Chinese ASAT programme on US and Russian security strategy 
therefore requires a closer inspection of individual national early warning systems. These systems 
are networks of infrared satellites which track the movement of ICBM boosters, thus ideally 
warning the target state in time to react by launching its defensive capabilities and signalling the 
military (Caston et al., 2014, p. 28). Although this satellite network is utilizing reconnaissance 
satellites, it is included in this part of the military strategy sections, as it operates in unison with 
ABM systems. The Defense Support Program (DSP) is the current early warning system of the 
United States and reportedly can give information about an ICBM up to 30 minutes before impact 
(Caston et al., 2014, p. 28). This is a tremendous achievement considering that ballistic missiles 
would previously strike quick and unexpectedly, so that any realization of an incoming attack and 
the consequent deployment of defence systems may have been too late without the early warning 
systems. This system is currently being replaced by the technologically refined Space-based 
Infrared System (SBIRS), which shares the same potential exposure to ASAT weapons. Russia 
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has a similar program to the DSP, named Oko (“eye” in Russian). This system is linked with the 
ABM systems protecting Russia’s population centres and constantly relays information; however, 
unfortunately this system is not entirely reliable and has been known to cause false alert (Forden, 
Podvig, & Postol, 2000, p. 31). Even so, these early warning systems are essential in the strategic 
defence planning of a state. 
Theory and Further Analysis 
An apt theoretical paradigm to further contemplate ballistic missiles and early warning 
systems that has persisted throughout the previous century is nuclear deterrence. Nuclear 
deterrence is a theoretical concept contemplating on the relation between two nuclear powers: it 
therefore states that two great powers will not risk a nuclear war if both states will be destroyed. 
This Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) would not benefit either country, as whilst the 
adversary can be eradicated entirely, the aggressor will also sacrifice himself due to second-strike 
capabilities (Mingst & Arreguín-Toft, 2011, pp. 48-56). Even if ballistic missiles would ravage a 
country such as the US or population centres in Russia, nuclear weapons launched from 
submarines and unmanned silos will launch in retaliation of the government. Whilst this is 
simplified by the coordination of GPS satellites for positioning and aiming, and communication 
satellites for administering the right timing, nuclear submarines would most likely still be able to 
launch counter-attacks. Arguably the only means to somewhat disable large-scale second-strike 
capabilities is to destroy all satellites of a certain state and its allies – a feat which is unthinkable 
with current technology. As long as states persist in aiming at another with the ability to launch 
without warning, relative peace should prevail.  
This theory is very relevant in Neo-Realism, particularly in regards to Kenneth Waltz. In 
an article from 1981, Kenneth Waltz famously argues that nuclear deterrence creates a stable 
world system, and that every state should construct functional nuclear weapons (Waltz, 1981), 
which may imply that building defensive capabilities will have a negative impact on the current 
world system. With the construction of sophisticated defence systems, however, a country may 
be able to avoid the second-strike retaliation of an adversary. Even so, the act of destroying such 
an early warning system in order to hinder deployment of ABM interceptor missiles will most 
likely be seen as direct act of war. 
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The likelihood of an ASAT weapon used on an early warning system is seemingly low. 
Whilst US military forces have previously expressed concerns over the Chinese ASAT tests and 
possible implications for the US ABM programme (Saunders & Lutes, 2007, p. 41), it seems that 
this attack would be a last-resort of a total war. There are numerous reasons for suggesting that 
this scenario is unlikely. Firstly, it is uncertain and unlikely whether China currently actually 
possesses the ability to target geo-stationary objects accurately; early warning satellites are in 
geo-stationary orbit, and are therefore more difficult to reach or destroy. Secondly, as there are 
various launch satellites in orbit, China would have to deploy a vast number of missiles which 
would need to accurately impact and destroy the targets in question. The cost and effort to utilize 
such an attack would be immense. Thirdly, the US would most definitely declare war or blatantly 
retaliate in the shape of a nuclear onslaught, fearing an immediate attack by China: Neo-Realism 
argues that survival is amongst the most significant motivations of a state; however, if an early 
warning system is attacked it may denote that MAD is imminent. The early warning systems are 
a survival tool and thus in the centre of concerns. Whilst the latter is less likely in the case of 
China targeting one early warning system satellite, a full-on attack on the whole DSP or Oko 
would strongly suggest that China is willing to fully engage in total war, using the entirety of its 
capabilities. Fourthly, US and Russian second-strike capabilities would still be a strong 
disincentive against destroying its early warning satellites. It would seem that in this instance 
MAD prevails, as no state could ever deny all second-strike capabilities of a nuclear power, 
which would allow the Realist’s take on MAD to continue as previously. Therefore, whilst the 
US military may fear the possible targeting of DSP satellites, it is perhaps the least likely 
destination for ASAT missiles from the satellites reviewed in this paper.  
On the other hand, one could assess ASAT missiles from a different perspective. Instead 
of the actual application of an ASAT missile, the strategic relevance of this weapon concerns the 
potential to use it, much like nuclear weapons have been somewhat of a hypothetical threat since 
the first two utilizations. One explanation of the Chinese ASAT programme may be that this 
country wishes to maintain nuclear deterrence as policy guiding principle. Since the motivations 
behind funding the Chinese ASAT programme are not transparent, it is unclear whether China is 
actually devising a weapon which could reach so far into space as to threaten these satellites. 
Even so, such capabilities are reflective of the concept of deterrence: as the US invests heavily 
into its early warning systems and ABMs, it gains more security against potential Chinese 
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second-strike capabilities and would therefore be in a far more powerful position compared to 
China, which possesses a rather rudimentary ABM system, although the 2010 and 2013 tests 
have implied China to be capable of successfully intercepting missiles (Weeden, 2014, p. 4-19). 
Thus, with the ability to destroy such early warning systems and effectively disabling the 
appropriate function of the ABMs, the US might be deterred from risking a nuclear strike against 
China. MAD remains a relevant aspect to the development of ASAT missiles: through their 
development, China has practically balanced the scales to some degree, and is therefore in a far 
more powerful position than previously. This is directly related to the Neo-Realist concepts of 
power, security, survival, and deterrence. At current, however, ASAT missiles are only capable 
of targeting satellites in low orbit and only concern those satellites which are more likely to be 
targeted than early-warning systems of US and Russia. 
Before moving onto the conclusion of this section, it should also be recognized that 
ASAT missiles seem to fit into recent Chinese grand strategy. In the years, China has become 
increasingly known to expand its expertise in cyber warfare. Cyber warfare can be analyzed in a 
similar fashion to ASAT missiles. This type of warfare does not result in military or civilian 
casualties per se; instead, it aims at disarming the opponent by cutting communications, 
overloading servers, or disrupting sensors. It seems, therefore, that cyber warfare might serve a 
similar purpose than ASAT weapons: to wage a war of disruption. China has been developing 
these capabilities, and Australia has made claims that the Chinese government has actively 
engaged in cyber espionage in recent years, whereas these accusations are denied by China 
(Hjortdal, 2011, pp. 2-13). If China is using cyber warfare to gather information, it may just be a 
matter of time before a more offensive use of cyber warfare may be experienced. This would 
effectively take the shape of a guerrilla-type warfare with a primary goal of disrupting the 
enemy’s interactions. In this context, ASAT missiles would compliment cyber attacks, practically 
shutting down primary and secondary communication and observation systems. Therefore, it is 
vital that the development of ASAT weapons gains more attention in academia and policy-
making. 
Additionally, a theoretical concept that becomes important in understanding ASAT 
missiles in regards to all the various targets described in this paper is space supremacy. The idea 
of space supremacy has been relevant to advances into outer space since the space race in the 
Cold War (Aldridge, 2001, pp. 48-49). The victor of the Cold War inevitably also won this 
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renowned space race. The US currently operates far more satellites than any other nation, and has 
its various categories of GPS, surveillance, and communication satellites spread throughout the 
orbit of Earth. This is reflected in the Realist paradigm, as states will generally seek to acquire 
more power than others as the “currency of international relations” (Mearsheimer, 2013, p. 72). 
In this case, the US acquired space supremacy and became a de-facto space hegemony. In recent 
years, however, China has become more active in space by developing new technologies and 
funding missions into space. Even before the 2007 test, some academics made the claim that 
China wishes to contest US space domination and asserts its own power position through the 
employment of increasing numbers of satellites (Adams & France, 2005, pp. 19-20). In 
theoretical terms, China is contesting for hegemony and expanding its own base of power. The 
creation of an ASAT weapon strengthens the assumptions in this speculation, as China has been 
more active in implying the denial or destruction of assets in space than any other space-faring 
nation. 
Prior to engaging the legality of ASAT weapons, this section provides a brief summary to 
conclude the military strategy part. ASAT missiles have vast implications on military strategy 
and tactics concerning the four satellite types mentioned above. It is therefore probably that great 
powers will focus more on finding alternate means to fulfil the functions of the satellites, as well 
as the swift replacement of potentially threatened satellites. Satellites will still be used since they 
are the most effective means of relaying information, whether this concerns communications or 
strategically and tactically important locations. Furthermore, the potential offensive dimension of 
ASAT missiles should not be underestimated. Such a use of the weapon would generally only 
allow for a brief tactical advantage, although the ability to disturb communications or GPS 
tracking could prove vital in an engagement. Additionally, a state with a functional ASAT arsenal 
could destroy any surveillance satellite and thus effectively render even a space hegemon such as 
the US blind. Thus, large states may need to find an alternative means to gain strategic 
information. Indeed, these two appliances of ASAT missiles are the most probably considering 
the current phase of development of ASAT weapons. The harbouring of such a weapon may also 
strengthen nuclear deterrence. The offensive use of such a weapon, however, is possible and 
under the current international regime, not entirely regulated in legal terms.  
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Part III: Legal Aspects 
Since the military potential of ASAT missiles has been outlined, this section will review 
the legal restrictions on the deliberate use of such a weapon. This part will therefore explore the 
existing international laws and restrictions, as well as organizations associated with ASAT 
weapons (- and to some degree ballistic missiles and interceptors, as they operate on a similar 
technical basis). Although generally different from the previous section, one has to understand 
the strategic implications as well as the current legal restrictions in order to understand the 
severity of the threat posed by ASAT weapons. Thus, this paper reviews various treaties which 
have some limited implications on ASAT harbouring, testing, or even use: these include the 
Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty, the Space Liability Convention. Furthermore, this section 
will briefly outline some international norms and the non-binding aspects of international law. 
Thus, this section attempts to further elaborate on the inability or unwillingness of the 
international community to address the security concerns discussed in the previous section.  
Context and Theory 
Before delving into international norms and laws, this paper will present the theoretical 
framework in which these terms are assessed. An argument that is to some extent important to 
this paper is how laws are created. According to some academics, various states throughout the 
world slowly form social identities and aspirations, which slowly evolved into shared norms, and 
eventually international laws (Mingst & Arreguín-Toft, 2011, pp. 228-229). The Realist 
paradigm, however, argues that international laws are to a great extent a tool of great power 
politics, as compliance is usually out of self-help motivations, whereas powerful states are often 
able to break international laws (Donnelly, 2013, p. 50). This means they are used to consolidate 
power and perhaps even diminish powers of another state through the use of international legal 
tools; this particularly relates to space supremacy. As this section will outline, the regulations on 
ASAT missiles are very rudimentary, in great part to the interest in the US, as well as China, to 
claim space superiority for themselves. In order to accomplish this, these states attempt to gain 
more control over space on a political and legal level. This view will be accepted in this thesis, as 
whilst some international laws have been established, no ASAT capability of China, the US, or 
Russia has thus far truly been regulated through the application of international law. In large part, 
this has been due to the power position of China and the US held in the Security Council of the 
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United Nations, which effectively allows them to veto any legal proposal or potential action taken 
against them. 
Perhaps the first things an academic will notice when reviewing the legal framework of 
ASAT missiles is that there is an apparent lack of any restrictions. ASAT missiles seem to be a 
secondary or tertiary concern for the international community. In many ways this is not 
surprising; after all, ASAT missiles are relatively modern weapons, which do not target civilians 
or even lives if used correctly. Furthermore, the only powers in the world with a functioning 
ASAT weapons programme are members of the UNSC, and may therefore use their power to 
influence international law. As mentioned previously, the three great military powers of the 
modern world are eager to sustain their ASAT programmes and may therefore veto the 
implementation of restrictive laws. Generally speaking, it is likely that attacks against a 
nationally owned satellite will be settled on a bilateral level; nonetheless, some international laws 
do attempt to provide lose legal considerations.  
International Laws 
The first legal implication of ASAT weapons concerns positioning and testing. In order to 
somewhat diminish the threat of ASAT missile harbouring and testing, the Outer Space Treaty 
attempts to limit some aspects entailed in this type of weapon. This treaty is most commonly 
known as the only international treaty which regulates space by addressing certain security 
concerns, specifically in regards to weapons of mass destruction. This treaty prohibits the 
stationing or testing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on any celestial body in space 
(Dembling & Arons,  1967, p. 422). This has some implications for ASAT capabilities, as some 
research into ASAT – such as EMPs – attempts to utilize nuclear warheads as means to destroy 
satellites in a relatively large area. The stationing of ASAT weapons in orbit might be a 
significant security concern for states, as any who possess such weapons would be able to strike 
immensely fast, while the ability to intercept such attacks will be heavily abated. Additionally, 
the treaty stipulates that space should be used peacefully and to the benefit of humanity – a notion 
that ASAT weapons commonly defy. The real issue in regards to ASAT weapons and the Outer 
Space Treaty is that the law only refers to weapons of mass destruction, and makes no mentioned 
of conventional weapons, such as any non-nuclear ASAT missiles (United Nations, 1967, p. 4). 
Even so, this treaty is ratified by a vast majority of countries, specifically those who are space-
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faring. As previously discussed, it seems that ASAT weapons are predominantly conventional 
weapons with the specific purpose of colliding with a satellite. Therefore, the stationing – and 
strictly speaking also the use – of ASAT weapons is not directly addressed in this treaty. 
Although this treaty has provided the legal framework for space law to develop, contemporary 
anti-satellite missiles have been omitted in this agreement. 
After the implementation of the Outer Space Treaty imposed the relatively meagre 
regulations and restrictions, various countries demanded the formation of a more comprehensive 
and strict agreement to further the peaceful international relations in regards to space, which lead 
to the creation of the Moon treaty; follow-on to the Outer Space Treaty. As the name implies, this 
agreement is mostly concerned with celestial bodies; however, also features articles which would 
have directly affected ASAT weapons. Two of the key points of the Moon treaty state that all 
military use of outer space are prohibited including the harbouring of conventional weapons and 
military bases (Nelson, 2011, p. 394). Additionally, the ratification of this treaty would have 
banned any weapons testing in space, which would have included the tests conducted by China in 
these last years. The problem with this treaty was, however, that it was never ratified by enough 
members to become legally binding. The Realist notions concerning this suggests that many 
countries were disinterested in ratifying such an agreement, as it may limit space for those who 
seek to strengthen their (military) power in space. Instead, the treaty failed, and attempts to revise 
the treaty or create some form of comprehensive test ban have also been abortive so far. This 
means that legally, the testing – and to some extent use – of ASAT weapons continues to be 
permissible so long as the targets are state-owned property.  
Despite the inability of the Outer Space Treaty to adequately regulate the use of weapons 
in space, the international community has implemented laws concerning the destruction of state-
owned space property. The destruction of state property is amongst the most important legal and 
financial implications for some countries in the current international system, as outlined by the 
Convention on International Liability for Damaged Caused by Space Objects (also known as 
Space Liability Convention). The Space Liability Convention of 1972 is one of the most 
significant treaties on the topic of ASAT weapons. Whilst there was only one case in which this 
treaty was referred to, it has perhaps, in fact, the only legal implication for states using ASAT 
weapons. This convention was originally intended to hold states responsible for damages to Earth 
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caused by satellites from their respective launching state; however, Article 3 of this convention 
states: 
“In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth to a 
space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space 
object by a space object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the 
damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.“ – United 
Nations, Convention on International Liability for Damaged Caused by Space Objects, 
1972, p. 2 
This means that whilst the convention itself is mostly concerned with damages to Earth, 
certain provisional limitations for ASAT missiles also exist within this legal framework. An 
ASAT missile would definitely fit into the category meaning that, hypothetically, China would 
have to claim responsibility for destroying a US satellite. Even so, this legal framework is quite 
flawed; rather than with political repercussions, this convention is mostly concerned with 
claiming compensation through diplomatic channels (United Nations, 1972, pp. 3-4). In the case 
of Chinese aggression, it can be assumed that such claims for compensation are secondary – 
depending on the satellite which is destroyed – to both parties. Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether such a diplomatic channel would still be available. Therefore, whilst this law is the only 
real legally binding treaty that is directly concerned with the destruction of satellites, it has not 
been drafted to address ASAT missiles in particular. The financial cost of such satellites is in 
most cases secondary, as if a state chooses to use ASAT weapons against another; it is most 
likely that the diplomatic and legal channels will not be effective.  
Apart from the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, various other treaties 
have some limited connotations in regards to ASAT missiles: One of these treaties is the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was signed between the US and the USSR (and later its successor 
state, The Russian Federation) in the days of the Cold War, and limited the amount of anti-
ballistic missile systems to one each (Coyle & Rhinelander, 2001, p. 16). Although this was not 
intended to directly influence ASAT missiles, this treaty limited the ability to convert ABM 
interceptor missiles to target satellites. The treaty was, however, abolished when the US 
withdrew in 2002, arguably in order to increase its ABM capabilities and thus secure more power 
for itself. This means that the US – and technically Russia – may also have the ability to convert 
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former ABM missiles into ASAT missiles, such as China has seemingly done in recent years. 
China was never party to this treaty which arguably had an impact on the Chinese development 
of ASAT missiles, as they were not temporarily restrained in their research. As it stands, 
however, renewing such an ABM treaty would most probably be ineffective in reducing ASAT 
capacities, as at least the US and China already possess these weapons. 
International Norms 
Despite this lack of appropriate treaties and laws, another aspect of the international legal 
system has recently attempted to raise public awareness: international norms. International norms 
generally refer to common values within a certain community which is vital in the creation of 
policies and laws. One example of international norms influencing policies to a large extent is 
nuclear disarmament (Freedman, 2013, p. 94). This policy was adopted throughout the world 
with international organizations overseeing the process. Although the success of these policies 
and laws has thus far been questionable, the disarmament movement has been a noticeable social 
and political cause, which also affects ASAT missiles. In a personal statement, Dr. Perikles 
Gasparini, Director of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, stated that space 
security – and therefore ASAT missiles – is important on the agenda of the UNODA (Gasparini, 
2016), even though UNODA does not currently have any legal instrument with which an actual 
disarmament would occur. In addition to this organization, others such as The Hague Code of 
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and the Arms Control Association. Since the Chinese ASAT 
test in 2007, the attention on this matter has increased, whereas it is still questionable how actual 
laws may be implemented. 
Final Thoughts on Legal Implications 
As this section has outlined, the legal means to avert the use of ASAT missiles are very 
limited. There are no particular laws that prohibit the use of ASAT missiles save laws protecting 
national property. The international community has not responded to this new dimension of 
warfare thus far, and whilst no ASAT missiles have been used offensively, laws should not be 
established for smaller states to secure their interests. China, the US, and possibly Russia, on the 
other hand, will not seek restriction of their programs as all of these parties intend to gain power. 
As all these states are permanent members of the UN Security Council, it is probable that 
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international laws drafted on the harbouring, proliferation, and use of ASAT missile systems will 
most likely be vetoed. After all, as suggested by the reviewed sources, China has shown immense 
interest and provided large monetary and political investment in further developing its ASAT 
capabilities. Without a legal framework to restrain such weapons, the military implications 
discussed previously become far more pressing. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Anti-satellite missiles are perhaps amongst the most unrestricted weapons in the 
international society. ASAT weapons do not cause vast damages to population areas or particular 
strategic positions in a warzone; however, as this paper has outlined, ASAT weapons are amongst 
the most important weapons of mass disruption in the modern political realm. In a world with 
nuclear deterrence, it is generally unlikely that two countries will engage in total war; therefore, 
smaller engagements are more common. ASAT weapons have various uses that may allow a 
force to overwhelm another through the disruption of information networks: the destruction of 
communication, positioning, or spy satellites would change a military engagement entirely. 
Additionally, ASAT weapons may potentially gain the future ability to target early-warning 
systems of ABM systems. This severely diminishes the nuclear security strategy of the US and 
Russia, who have both invested in ABM systems and early-warning satellites. At the same time, 
however, this has connotations for the states which posses ASAT weapons, as these countries 
now possess the ability to challenge another state for dominance of space and potentially threaten 
the very existence of the opposing state in question (if early warning systems are targeted). 
Therefore, the restriction of ASAT weapons is important for space faring nations without ASAT 
capabilities, but will most likely fail to be implemented as great power politics still largely dictate 
international law. 
In essence, ASAT missiles are somewhat comparable to cyber warfare: whilst the 
disruption of an adversary’s military apparatus does not threaten the civilian population or even 
the state directly, it allows for other security concerns to develop which may eventually lead to 
heavy violent engagements. Therefore, states in possession of satellites should refine their 
respective security policies in regards to satellites, possibly through the continued investment into 
interceptor missiles and warning systems against ASAT missiles. It should also be remembered 
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that the current ASAT capabilities are still rudimentary, and can relatively easily be defended. 
The issue is the continuous development into increased range and destructive capacity (ie. 
through EMP development), particularly in China in recent years. If such capabilities are 
developed, China has the ability to fight a guerrilla-style war against any adversary with more 
military capabilities by destroying the information network necessary to conduct a modern 
military engagement. 
In addition to revising state security policies, international laws should be strengthened to 
address ASAT missiles in terms of harbouring, testing, and use. The international community has 
imposed very few restrictions on ASAT missiles, whereas arguably the most notable of these is 
the Liability Treaty. The international community is currently seemingly more concerned with 
the financial aspects of destroyed satellites than the security implications of the use of such a 
weapon – a trend which is explained by the Neo-Realist paradigm. Other treaties such as the 
Outer Space Treaty contributed somewhat to prohibit some aspects of testing; however, the 
current restrictions are not severe enough. If the international community could break with this 
paradigm of legal great power politics, ASAT missiles could be disarmed. This is, however, 
unlikely, as these exact ASAT missiles immensely increase Chinese military – and thus political 
– power. Therefore, ASAT weapons will continue to be a prevalent weapon in the political and 
legal discussions of the future. 
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